forked from Zakaria/hermes-agent
Hermes-agent
This commit is contained in:
Zakaria
Executable
+468
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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# s6-overlay stage2 hook — runs as root after the supervision tree is
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# up but before user services start. Handles UID/GID remap, volume
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# chown, config seeding, and skills sync.
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#
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# Per-service privilege drop happens inside each service's `run` script
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# (and in main-wrapper.sh) via s6-setuidgid, not here.
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#
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# Wired into the image as /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup by the
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# Dockerfile. The shim at docker/entrypoint.sh forwards to this script
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# so external references to docker/entrypoint.sh still work.
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#
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# NB: cont-init.d scripts run with no arguments — the user's CMD args
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# are NOT visible here. That's fine: we use Architecture B (s6-overlay
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# main-program model), so main-wrapper.sh runs the CMD with full
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# stdin/stdout/stderr access and handles arg parsing there.
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set -eu
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HERMES_HOME="${HERMES_HOME:-/opt/data}"
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INSTALL_DIR="/opt/hermes"
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# Drop to hermes via s6-setuidgid, but skip it when already non-root.
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as_hermes() { [ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || { "$@"; return; }; s6-setuidgid hermes "$@"; }
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# --- Reject the unsupported `docker run --user <uid>:<gid>` start ---
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# Detect the case where the container was launched with `--user` pinned to an
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# arbitrary host UID (the classic `--user $(id -u):$(id -g)` invocation people
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# used in the tini era to make container-written files match their host user).
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#
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# Under s6-overlay this no longer works: the bootstrap (UID remap, volume +
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# build-tree chown, config seeding) all require root, and they're skipped when
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# the container starts non-root. The baked image trees (/opt/data, /opt/hermes/
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# .venv, ui-tui, node_modules) stay owned by the hermes build UID (10000), so an
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# arbitrary `--user` UID can't write them — the runtime then fails with EACCES
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# on a bind mount, or hard-crashes on a named volume (Docker initialises the
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# volume from the image as UID 10000, and the non-root start can't even `cd`
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# into $HERMES_HOME). See #34837 for the supervision-tree side of this.
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#
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# The supported way to match host-side ownership is to start as root (the image
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# default) and pass HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID — or the PUID/PGID aliases — which the
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# remap block below consumes via usermod/groupmod + targeted chown. That gives
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# the exact same outcome (files owned by your host UID) without breaking s6.
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#
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# preinit runs setuid-root (euid=0) but cont-init.d hooks run with the real UID
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# the container was started as, so `id -u` here is the host UID (e.g. 1000), and
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# `id -u hermes` is the unremapped build UID (10000) because no root-only remap
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# could run. root starts (id -u = 0) and the normal supervised drop to the
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# hermes UID are both unaffected.
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cur_uid="$(id -u)"
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if [ "$cur_uid" != 0 ] && [ "$cur_uid" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
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cat >&2 <<EOF
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[stage2] ERROR: container started with --user $cur_uid (an arbitrary, non-hermes UID).
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This is not supported under the s6-overlay image. The container bootstrap
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(UID remap, volume ownership, dependency installs) needs to start as root,
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and the baked image directories are owned by the hermes user (UID $(id -u hermes)),
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so a pinned --user UID cannot write them — startup will fail.
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To make container-written files match your HOST user, DON'T use --user.
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Start the container as root (the default) and pass your host UID/GID instead:
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docker run -e HERMES_UID=\$(id -u) -e HERMES_GID=\$(id -g) ...
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NAS users (Synology / unRAID / UGOS) can use the PUID/PGID aliases:
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docker run -e PUID=\$(id -u) -e PGID=\$(id -g) ...
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The image remaps the hermes user to that UID/GID at boot and chowns the data
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volume accordingly, so files land owned by your host user — the same outcome
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--user was being used for, without breaking the supervision tree.
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EOF
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exit 1
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fi
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# --- Bootstrap HERMES_HOME as root ---
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# Create the directory (and any missing parents) while we still have root
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# privileges so the chown checks below see real metadata and the later
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# `s6-setuidgid hermes mkdir -p` block doesn't EACCES on root-owned
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# ancestors. Without this, custom HERMES_HOME paths whose parents only
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# root can create (e.g. `HERMES_HOME=/home/hermes/.hermes` in a Compose
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# file, or any path under a fresh / not pre-populated by the image)
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# fail on first boot with `mkdir: cannot create directory '/...': Permission
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# denied` and the cont-init hook exits non-zero. Idempotent — `mkdir -p`
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# is a no-op if the dir already exists. (#18482, salvages #18488)
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mkdir -p "$HERMES_HOME"
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# Numeric UID/GID validation: must be digits only, non-root, 1-65534.
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# NAS hosts such as Unraid commonly use low non-root IDs (99:100).
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validate_uid_gid() {
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case "$1" in
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''|*[!0-9]*) return 1 ;;
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*) [ "$1" -ge 1 ] && [ "$1" -le 65534 ] ;;
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esac
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}
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# --- UID/GID remap ---
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# Accept PUID/PGID as aliases for HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID. NAS users (UGOS,
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# Synology, unRAID) expect the LinuxServer.io PUID/PGID convention and
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# bind-mount /opt/data from a host directory owned by their own UID; without
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# this alias those vars are silently ignored and the s6-setuidgid drop to
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# UID 10000 leaves the runtime unable to read the volume. HERMES_UID/
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# HERMES_GID still win when both are set. See #15290, salvages #25872.
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HERMES_UID="${HERMES_UID:-${PUID:-}}"
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HERMES_GID="${HERMES_GID:-${PGID:-}}"
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if [ -n "${HERMES_UID:-}" ] && validate_uid_gid "$HERMES_UID" && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
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echo "[stage2] Changing hermes UID to $HERMES_UID"
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usermod -u "$HERMES_UID" hermes
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fi
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if [ -n "${HERMES_GID:-}" ] && validate_uid_gid "$HERMES_GID" && [ "$HERMES_GID" != "$(id -g hermes)" ]; then
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echo "[stage2] Changing hermes GID to $HERMES_GID"
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# -o allows non-unique GID (e.g. macOS GID 20 "staff" may already
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# exist as "dialout" in the Debian-based container image).
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groupmod -o -g "$HERMES_GID" hermes 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# --- Docker socket group membership (docker-in-docker / DooD) ---
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# When the user bind-mounts the host Docker daemon socket
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# (`-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock`) to use the `docker`
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# terminal backend from inside the container, the socket is owned by the
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# host's `docker` group (or root). The supervised hermes user (UID 10000)
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# is not a member of any group that matches the socket's GID, so every
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# `docker` invocation EACCES'es and `check_terminal_requirements()` fails.
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# See #16703.
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#
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# Granting the supp group via `docker run --group-add <gid>` alone is
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# NOT sufficient with our s6-setuidgid privilege drop: s6-setuidgid (and
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# gosu, the older shim) calls initgroups() for the target user, which
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# rebuilds the supplementary group list from /etc/group. Without an
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# /etc/group entry whose GID matches the socket, the kernel-granted
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# supp group is silently wiped between PID 1 and the dropped process.
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# Confirmed empirically: `--group-add 998` alone leaves the dropped
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# hermes process with `Groups: 10000` (998 gone); after this hook adds
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# the entry, the dropped process has `Groups: 998 10000` as expected.
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#
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# Fix: detect the socket's GID at boot and ensure /etc/group has a
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# matching entry that includes hermes. Idempotent across container
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# restarts. Skipped silently when no socket is bind-mounted.
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#
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# Handles the awkward corner cases:
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# - socket owned by GID 0 (root) — some Podman setups; usermod -aG root
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# - socket GID already used by a known container group (e.g. tty=5):
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# reuse that group's name rather than creating a duplicate
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# - hermes is already a member of the right group (idempotent restart)
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# - chown/groupadd failures under rootless containers — non-fatal
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for sock in /var/run/docker.sock /run/docker.sock; do
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[ -S "$sock" ] || continue
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sock_gid=$(stat -c '%g' "$sock" 2>/dev/null) || continue
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[ -n "$sock_gid" ] || continue
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# Already a member? Nothing to do.
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if id -G hermes 2>/dev/null | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx "$sock_gid"; then
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echo "[stage2] hermes already in group $sock_gid for $sock"
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break
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fi
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# Resolve or create a group name for this GID.
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sock_group=$(getent group "$sock_gid" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f1)
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if [ -z "$sock_group" ]; then
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sock_group="hostdocker"
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if ! groupadd -g "$sock_gid" "$sock_group" 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "[stage2] Warning: groupadd -g $sock_gid $sock_group failed; skipping docker socket group setup"
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break
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fi
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echo "[stage2] Created group $sock_group (GID $sock_gid) for Docker socket"
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fi
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if usermod -aG "$sock_group" hermes 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "[stage2] Added hermes to group $sock_group (GID $sock_gid) for $sock"
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else
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echo "[stage2] Warning: usermod -aG $sock_group hermes failed; docker backend may fail with EACCES"
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fi
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break
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done
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# --- Fix ownership of data volume ---
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# When HERMES_UID is remapped or the top-level $HERMES_HOME isn't owned by
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# the runtime hermes UID, restore ownership to hermes — but ONLY for the
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# directories hermes actually writes to. The full $HERMES_HOME may be a
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# host-mounted bind containing unrelated user files; `chown -R` would
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# silently destroy host ownership of those (see issue #19788).
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#
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# The canonical list of hermes-owned subdirs is the same one the s6-setuidgid
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# mkdir -p block below seeds. Keep them in sync if the seed list changes.
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actual_hermes_uid=$(id -u hermes)
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needs_chown=false
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if [ "$(stat -c %u "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null)" != "$actual_hermes_uid" ]; then
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needs_chown=true
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fi
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if [ "$needs_chown" = true ]; then
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echo "[stage2] Fixing ownership of $HERMES_HOME (targeted) to hermes ($actual_hermes_uid)"
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# In rootless Podman the container's "root" is mapped to an
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# unprivileged host UID — chown will fail. That's fine: the volume
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# is already owned by the mapped user on the host side.
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#
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# Top-level $HERMES_HOME: chown the directory itself (not its contents)
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# so hermes can mkdir new subdirs but bind-mounted host files keep
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# their existing ownership.
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chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null || \
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echo "[stage2] Warning: chown $HERMES_HOME failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
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# Hermes-owned subdirs: recursive chown is safe here because these are
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# created and managed exclusively by hermes (see the s6-setuidgid mkdir
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# -p block below for the canonical list).
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for sub in cron sessions logs hooks memories skills skins plans workspace home profiles pairing platforms/pairing; do
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if [ -e "$HERMES_HOME/$sub" ]; then
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chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/$sub" 2>/dev/null || \
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echo "[stage2] Warning: chown $HERMES_HOME/$sub failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
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fi
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done
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fi
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# --- Fix ownership of build trees under $INSTALL_DIR ---
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# Hermes-owned trees under $INSTALL_DIR must be re-chowned whenever the
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# runtime hermes UID no longer owns them — otherwise:
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# - .venv: lazy_deps.py cannot install platform packages (discord.py,
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# telegram, slack, etc.) with EACCES (#15012, #21100)
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# - ui-tui: esbuild rebuilds dist/entry.js on every TUI launch (when
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# the source mtime is newer than dist/ or when HERMES_TUI_FORCE_BUILD
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# is set) and writes to ui-tui/dist/. Without this chown the new
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# hermes UID can't write the build output (#28851).
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# - gateway: Python writes __pycache__ and runtime artifacts beneath the
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# gateway package on first import. After a UID remap those source-owned
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# paths still belong to the build-time UID (10000) unless repaired here,
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# producing EACCES for the supervised gateway (#27221).
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# - node_modules: root-level dependencies (puppeteer, web tooling)
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# that runtime code may walk/update.
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# The set mirrors the build-time `chown -R hermes:hermes` line in the
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# Dockerfile — keep them in sync if the Dockerfile chown set changes.
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# These are under $INSTALL_DIR (not $HERMES_HOME), so the bind-mount
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# concern doesn't apply — recursive is fine.
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#
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# This MUST be gated independently of the $HERMES_HOME ownership check
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# above. `usermod -u <new> hermes` re-chowns the hermes home dir
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# ($HERMES_HOME == /opt/data) to the new UID as a side effect, so after a
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# HERMES_UID/PUID remap `stat $HERMES_HOME` always already matches the new
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# UID and `needs_chown` is false — but the build trees under /opt/hermes
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# are NOT touched by usermod and remain owned by the build-time UID
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# (10000). Gating them on $HERMES_HOME ownership (as #35027 did) silently
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# skipped this chown on the common PUID/NAS path, regressing lazy installs
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# and TUI rebuilds. Probe the build trees directly instead: chown only
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# when the venv is not already owned by the runtime hermes UID. Idempotent
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# and skips the expensive recursive chown on every restart once ownership
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# is settled.
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venv_owner=$(stat -c %u "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [ -n "$venv_owner" ] && [ "$venv_owner" != "$actual_hermes_uid" ]; then
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echo "[stage2] Fixing ownership of build trees under $INSTALL_DIR to hermes ($actual_hermes_uid)"
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chown -R hermes:hermes \
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"$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" \
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"$INSTALL_DIR/ui-tui" \
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"$INSTALL_DIR/gateway" \
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"$INSTALL_DIR/node_modules" \
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2>/dev/null || \
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echo "[stage2] Warning: chown of build trees failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
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fi
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# Always reset ownership of $HERMES_HOME/profiles to hermes on every
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# boot. Profile dirs and files can land owned by root when commands
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# are invoked via `docker exec <container> hermes …` (which defaults
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# to root unless `-u` is passed), and that breaks the cont-init
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# reconciler (02-reconcile-profiles) which runs as hermes and walks
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# the profiles dir. Idempotent; skipped on rootless containers where
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# chown would fail.
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if [ -d "$HERMES_HOME/profiles" ]; then
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chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/profiles" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# Always reset ownership of $HERMES_HOME/cron on every boot for the same
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# docker-exec/root-write reason as profiles/. The cron scheduler state
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# (jobs.json) must stay readable by the unprivileged hermes runtime even
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# after root-context maintenance commands or scheduler writes.
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if [ -d "$HERMES_HOME/cron" ]; then
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chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/cron" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# Reset ownership of hermes-owned top-level state files on every boot.
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# The targeted data-volume chown above only covers hermes-owned
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# *subdirectories*; loose state files living directly under $HERMES_HOME
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# are missed. When those files are created or rewritten by
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# `docker exec <container> hermes …` (root unless `-u` is passed) they
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# land root-owned, and the unprivileged hermes runtime then hits
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# PermissionError on next startup (e.g. gateway.lock / state.db /
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# auth.json), producing a gateway restart loop.
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#
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# We use an explicit allowlist rather than a blanket `find -user root`
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# sweep so host-owned files in a bind-mounted $HERMES_HOME are never
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# touched — same targeted-ownership contract as the subdir chown above
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# (issue #19788, PR #19795). The list mirrors the top-level *file*
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# entries of hermes_cli.profile_distribution.USER_OWNED_EXCLUDE plus the
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# runtime lock files; keep them in sync if that set changes.
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for f in \
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auth.json auth.lock .env \
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state.db state.db-shm state.db-wal \
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hermes_state.db \
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response_store.db response_store.db-shm response_store.db-wal \
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gateway.pid gateway.lock gateway_state.json processes.json \
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active_profile; do
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if [ -e "$HERMES_HOME/$f" ]; then
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chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/$f" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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done
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# --- config.yaml permissions ---
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# Ensure config.yaml is readable by the hermes runtime user even if it
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# was edited on the host after initial ownership setup.
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if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" ]; then
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chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
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chmod 640 "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# --- Seed directory structure as hermes user ---
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# Run as hermes via s6-setuidgid so dirs end up owned correctly (matters
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# under rootless Podman where chown back to root would fail).
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#
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# Use direct `mkdir -p` invocation (no `sh -c "..."` wrapper) so the
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# shell isn't a second interpreter — defends against $HERMES_HOME values
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# containing shell metacharacters. PR #30136 review item O2.
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as_hermes mkdir -p \
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"$HERMES_HOME/cron" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/sessions" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/logs" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/hooks" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/memories" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/skills" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/skins" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/plans" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/workspace" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/home" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/pairing" \
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"$HERMES_HOME/platforms/pairing"
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# --- Install-method stamp (read by detect_install_method() in hermes status) ---
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# Preserved from the tini-era entrypoint (PR #27843). Must be written as
|
||||
# the hermes user so ownership matches the file's documented owner.
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||||
# tee is invoked directly via s6-setuidgid (no `sh -c` wrapper) for the
|
||||
# same shell-metacharacter safety described above.
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printf 'docker\n' | as_hermes tee "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" >/dev/null \
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|| true
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||||
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# --- Seed config files (only on first boot) ---
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seed_one() {
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dest=$1
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src=$2
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if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/$dest" ] && [ -f "$INSTALL_DIR/$src" ]; then
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as_hermes cp "$INSTALL_DIR/$src" "$HERMES_HOME/$dest"
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||||
fi
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||||
}
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||||
seed_one ".env" ".env.example"
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||||
seed_one "config.yaml" "cli-config.yaml.example"
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||||
seed_one "SOUL.md" "docker/SOUL.md"
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||||
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||||
# .env holds API keys and secrets — restrict to owner-only access. Applied
|
||||
# unconditionally (not only on first-seed) so a host-mounted .env that was
|
||||
# created with a permissive umask gets tightened on every container start.
|
||||
if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/.env" ]; then
|
||||
chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/.env" 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/.env" 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Migrate persisted config schema ---
|
||||
# Docker image upgrades replace the code under $INSTALL_DIR but preserve
|
||||
# $HERMES_HOME on the mounted volume. Run the same safe, non-interactive
|
||||
# config-schema migrations that `hermes update` runs for non-Docker installs,
|
||||
# after first-boot seeding and before supervised gateway services start.
|
||||
# Set HERMES_SKIP_CONFIG_MIGRATION=1 for controlled/manual migrations.
|
||||
if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" ]; then
|
||||
s6-setuidgid hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv/bin/python" "$INSTALL_DIR/scripts/docker_config_migrate.py" \
|
||||
|| echo "[stage2] Warning: docker_config_migrate.py failed; continuing"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# auth.json: bootstrap from env on first boot only. Same semantics as the
|
||||
# pre-s6 entrypoint — the [ ! -f ] guard is critical to avoid clobbering
|
||||
# rotated refresh tokens on container restart.
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" ] && [ -n "${HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP:-}" ]; then
|
||||
printf '%s' "$HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP" > "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
|
||||
chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# gateway_state.json: declare the gateway's INITIAL supervised state on a
|
||||
# fresh volume. Same first-boot-only env-seed pattern as auth.json above.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# On a blank volume there is no gateway_state.json, so the boot reconciler
|
||||
# (cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles → container_boot.reconcile_profile_gateways)
|
||||
# registers the gateway-default s6 slot but leaves it DOWN — it only
|
||||
# auto-starts when the last recorded state was "running". That means a
|
||||
# freshly-provisioned container comes up with the gateway down until
|
||||
# someone starts it (e.g. from the dashboard). An orchestrator that
|
||||
# provisions a fresh volume and wants the gateway running from first boot
|
||||
# can set HERMES_GATEWAY_BOOTSTRAP_STATE=running; we seed the state file
|
||||
# here, BEFORE 02-reconcile-profiles runs (cont-init.d scripts run in
|
||||
# lexicographic order), so the reconciler sees prior_state=running and
|
||||
# brings the supervised slot up on the very first boot.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is a generic container contract, not specific to any host: it seeds
|
||||
# the SAME gateway_state.json the reconciler already consults, exactly as
|
||||
# HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP seeds auth.json. The [ ! -f ] guard is the
|
||||
# load-bearing part — on every subsequent boot the persisted state wins,
|
||||
# so a gateway the operator deliberately stopped stays stopped across
|
||||
# restarts and we never clobber real runtime state.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Only a literal "running" is honoured (the sole value in the reconciler's
|
||||
# _AUTOSTART_STATES); any other value is ignored so a typo can't write a
|
||||
# bogus state the reconciler would treat as "no prior state" anyway.
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json" ] && \
|
||||
[ "${HERMES_GATEWAY_BOOTSTRAP_STATE:-}" = "running" ]; then
|
||||
printf '{"gateway_state":"running"}\n' > "$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json"
|
||||
chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json" 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
chmod 644 "$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Sync bundled skills ---
|
||||
# Invoke the venv's python by absolute path so we don't need a `sh -c`
|
||||
# wrapper to source the activate script. This is safe because
|
||||
# skills_sync.py doesn't depend on any environment exports beyond what
|
||||
# the python binary's own bin-stub already sets up (sys.path is rooted
|
||||
# at the venv's site-packages by virtue of running .venv/bin/python).
|
||||
if [ -d "$INSTALL_DIR/skills" ]; then
|
||||
as_hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv/bin/python" "$INSTALL_DIR/tools/skills_sync.py" \
|
||||
|| echo "[stage2] Warning: skills_sync.py failed; continuing"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Discover agent-browser's Chromium binary ---
|
||||
# The image's Dockerfile runs `npx playwright install chromium`, which
|
||||
# populates ``$PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH`` (=/opt/hermes/.playwright) with
|
||||
# a ``chromium_headless_shell-<build>/chrome-headless-shell-linux64/``
|
||||
# directory. agent-browser (the runtime CLI Hermes spawns for the
|
||||
# browser tool) doesn't recognise this layout in its own cache scan and
|
||||
# fails with "Auto-launch failed: Chrome not found" — even though the
|
||||
# binary is right there (#15697).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Fix: locate the binary at boot and export ``AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH``
|
||||
# via /run/s6/container_environment so the `with-contenv` shebang on
|
||||
# main-wrapper.sh propagates it into the supervised ``hermes`` process
|
||||
# and thence to agent-browser subprocesses.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Skipped when the user has already set ``AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH``
|
||||
# (lets users override with a system Chrome install).
|
||||
# - Filename-matched (not path-matched): the chromium dir contains many
|
||||
# shared libraries (libGLESv2.so, libEGL.so, ...) which inherit the
|
||||
# executable bit from Playwright's tarball but are NOT browser binaries.
|
||||
# We only accept files whose basename is chrome / chromium /
|
||||
# chrome-headless-shell / headless_shell / chromium-browser. Compare
|
||||
# PR #18635's earlier ``find | grep -Ei 'chrome|chromium'`` which would
|
||||
# match the path ``.../chrome-headless-shell-linux64/libGLESv2.so`` and
|
||||
# pick a .so.
|
||||
# - Quietly skipped when $PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH doesn't exist (e.g.
|
||||
# custom builds that strip Playwright).
|
||||
if [ -z "${AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH:-}" ] && \
|
||||
[ -n "${PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH:-}" ] && \
|
||||
[ -d "$PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH" ]; then
|
||||
browser_bin=$(find "$PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH" -type f -executable \
|
||||
\( -name 'chrome' -o -name 'chromium' \
|
||||
-o -name 'chrome-headless-shell' -o -name 'headless_shell' \
|
||||
-o -name 'chromium-browser' \) \
|
||||
2>/dev/null | head -n 1)
|
||||
if [ -n "$browser_bin" ]; then
|
||||
echo "[stage2] Found agent-browser Chromium binary: $browser_bin"
|
||||
# Write to s6's container_environment so with-contenv picks it
|
||||
# up for all supervised services (main-hermes, dashboard, etc.).
|
||||
# Idempotent: each boot overwrites with the current path.
|
||||
# Some container runtimes / s6-overlay versions do not create the
|
||||
# envdir before cont-init hooks run, so create it defensively.
|
||||
mkdir -p /run/s6/container_environment
|
||||
printf '%s' "$browser_bin" > /run/s6/container_environment/AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "[stage2] Warning: no Chromium binary under $PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH; browser tool may fail"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[stage2] Setup complete; starting user services"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user