forked from Zakaria/hermes-agent
Hermes-agent
This commit is contained in:
Zakaria
@@ -0,0 +1,536 @@
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"""User-authorization methods for ``GatewayRunner``.
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Extracted from ``gateway/run.py`` as part of the god-file decomposition campaign
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(``~/.hermes/plans/god-file-decomposition.md``, Phase 3 mechanical mixin lifts).
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This mixin holds the inbound-message authorization cluster: whether a user/chat
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is allowed to talk to the agent, the per-adapter DM policy, and the
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unauthorized-DM behavior.
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Behavior-neutral: every method is lifted verbatim from ``GatewayRunner``.
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``self.*`` calls resolve unchanged via the MRO. Neutral dependencies import at
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module top; the module-level ``logger`` is imported lazily inside the one method
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that uses it (``from gateway.run import logger`` resolves at call time, when
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``gateway.run`` is fully loaded) so this module never imports ``gateway.run`` at
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import time -> no import cycle. The lazy import preserves the exact logger name
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(``"gateway.run"``) so log records are unchanged.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from typing import Optional
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from gateway.config import Platform
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from gateway.session import SessionSource
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from gateway.whatsapp_identity import (
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expand_whatsapp_aliases as _expand_whatsapp_auth_aliases,
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normalize_whatsapp_identifier as _normalize_whatsapp_identifier,
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)
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class GatewayAuthorizationMixin:
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"""User/chat authorization methods for ``GatewayRunner``."""
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def _adapter_enforces_own_access_policy(self, platform: Optional[Platform]) -> bool:
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"""Whether the adapter for *platform* gates access at intake itself.
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Mirrors ``BasePlatformAdapter.enforces_own_access_policy``. Adapters
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such as WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, QQBot, and WhatsApp evaluate their
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documented ``dm_policy`` / ``group_policy`` / ``allow_from`` config before a
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message is dispatched to the gateway. The flag alone is NOT "already
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authorized": these adapters default to ``open``, which forwards every
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sender, so ``_is_user_authorized`` only trusts the adapter when its
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effective policy for the chat type is an actual ``allowlist`` restriction
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(see that method). Defaults to ``False`` when the adapter is unknown or
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doesn't expose the flag.
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"""
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if not platform:
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return False
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# Some test helpers build a bare GatewayRunner via object.__new__ and
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# never set ``adapters``; treat a missing/empty map as "no adapter"
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# rather than raising (see pitfalls.md #17).
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adapters = getattr(self, "adapters", None)
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if not adapters:
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return False
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adapter = adapters.get(platform)
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if adapter is None:
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return False
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return bool(getattr(adapter, "enforces_own_access_policy", False))
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def _adapter_dm_policy(self, platform: Optional[Platform]) -> str:
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"""Best-effort read of an own-policy adapter's effective DM policy.
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Returns the lowercased ``dm_policy`` (``"open"`` / ``"allowlist"`` /
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``"disabled"`` / ``"pairing"``) for *platform*, or ``""`` when unknown.
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Prefers the live adapter's resolved ``_dm_policy`` — which already folds
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in both ``config.extra`` and the ``<PLATFORM>_DM_POLICY`` env var (the
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env var is not always bridged back into ``config.extra``) — and falls
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back to ``config.extra`` for bare runners built without a live adapter.
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Used by ``_is_user_authorized`` to decide whether an own-policy adapter
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actually restricted DM senders to a configured allowlist (trustworthy)
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or merely forwarded everyone under ``dm_policy: open`` / for a pairing
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handshake (not authorization). "Reached the gateway" only carries an
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authorization signal in the ``allowlist`` case.
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"""
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if not platform:
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return ""
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adapters = getattr(self, "adapters", None) or {}
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adapter = adapters.get(platform)
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policy = getattr(adapter, "_dm_policy", None) if adapter is not None else None
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if policy is None:
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config = getattr(self, "config", None)
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platform_cfg = (
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config.platforms.get(platform)
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if config is not None and hasattr(config, "platforms")
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else None
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)
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extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None
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if isinstance(extra, dict):
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policy = extra.get("dm_policy")
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return str(policy or "").strip().lower()
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def _adapter_group_policy(self, platform: Optional[Platform]) -> str:
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"""Best-effort read of an own-policy adapter's effective group policy.
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Mirror of ``_adapter_dm_policy`` for group / forum / channel traffic:
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returns the lowercased ``group_policy`` (``"open"`` / ``"allowlist"`` /
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``"disabled"``) for *platform*, or ``""`` when unknown. Prefers the live
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adapter's resolved ``_group_policy`` and falls back to ``config.extra``
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for bare runners built without a live adapter.
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Used by ``_is_user_authorized`` to decide whether an own-policy adapter
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restricted group senders to a configured allowlist (trustworthy) or
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forwarded the whole channel under ``group_policy: open`` (not
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authorization).
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"""
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if not platform:
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return ""
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adapters = getattr(self, "adapters", None) or {}
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adapter = adapters.get(platform)
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policy = getattr(adapter, "_group_policy", None) if adapter is not None else None
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if policy is None:
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config = getattr(self, "config", None)
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platform_cfg = (
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config.platforms.get(platform)
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if config is not None and hasattr(config, "platforms")
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else None
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)
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extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None
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if isinstance(extra, dict):
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policy = extra.get("group_policy")
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return str(policy or "").strip().lower()
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def _adapter_group_has_sender_allowlist(
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self,
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platform: Optional[Platform],
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chat_id: Optional[str],
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) -> bool:
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"""Whether a per-group sender allowlist gated this group message.
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WeCom supports ``groups.<group_id>.allow_from`` on top of the top-level
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``group_policy``. A group may be open at the chat level while still
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restricting which senders inside that group can invoke Hermes. If such a
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message reached the gateway, the adapter already checked that sender
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allowlist, so it is a trustworthy intake decision rather than the
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fail-open ``group_policy: open`` case.
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"""
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if not platform or not chat_id:
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return False
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adapters = getattr(self, "adapters", None) or {}
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adapter = adapters.get(platform)
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groups = getattr(adapter, "_groups", None) if adapter is not None else None
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if groups is None:
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config = getattr(self, "config", None)
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platform_cfg = (
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config.platforms.get(platform)
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if config is not None and hasattr(config, "platforms")
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else None
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)
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extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None
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if isinstance(extra, dict):
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groups = extra.get("groups")
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if not isinstance(groups, dict):
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return False
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chat_id_str = str(chat_id)
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group_cfg = groups.get(chat_id_str)
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if not isinstance(group_cfg, dict):
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lowered = chat_id_str.lower()
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for key, value in groups.items():
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if isinstance(key, str) and key.lower() == lowered and isinstance(value, dict):
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group_cfg = value
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break
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if not isinstance(group_cfg, dict):
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group_cfg = groups.get("*")
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if not isinstance(group_cfg, dict):
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return False
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sender_allow = group_cfg.get("allow_from") or group_cfg.get("allowFrom")
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if isinstance(sender_allow, str):
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return bool(sender_allow.strip())
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if isinstance(sender_allow, (list, tuple, set)):
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return any(str(item).strip() for item in sender_allow)
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return False
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def _is_user_authorized(self, source: SessionSource) -> bool:
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"""
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Check if a user is authorized to use the bot.
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Checks in order:
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1. Per-platform allow-all flag (e.g., DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true)
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2. Environment variable allowlists (TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS, etc.)
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3. DM pairing approved list
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4. Global allow-all (GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true)
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5. Default: deny
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"""
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from gateway.run import logger
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# Home Assistant events are system-generated (state changes), not
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# user-initiated messages. The HASS_TOKEN already authenticates the
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# connection, so HA events are always authorized.
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# Webhook events are authenticated via HMAC signature validation in
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# the adapter itself — no user allowlist applies.
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if source.platform in {Platform.HOMEASSISTANT, Platform.WEBHOOK}:
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return True
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user_id = source.user_id
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# Telegram (and similar) authorize entire group/forum/channel chats
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# by chat ID via TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS / QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS.
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# That allowlist is chat-scoped, so it must work even when
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# source.user_id is None — Telegram emits anonymous-admin posts,
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# sender_chat traffic, and channel broadcasts with no `from_user`,
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# and an operator who explicitly listed the chat expects those to
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# be honored. Run this check before the no-user-id guard below so
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# documented behavior matches reality
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# (website/docs/reference/environment-variables.md,
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# website/docs/user-guide/messaging/telegram.md).
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if source.chat_type in {"group", "forum", "channel"} and source.chat_id:
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chat_allowlist_env = {
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Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS",
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Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",
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}.get(source.platform, "")
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if chat_allowlist_env:
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raw_chat_allowlist = os.getenv(chat_allowlist_env, "").strip()
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if raw_chat_allowlist:
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allowed_group_ids = {
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cid.strip()
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for cid in raw_chat_allowlist.split(",")
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if cid.strip()
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}
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if "*" in allowed_group_ids or source.chat_id in allowed_group_ids:
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return True
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if not user_id:
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return False
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platform_env_map = {
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Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.WHATSAPP: "WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.WHATSAPP_CLOUD: "WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.SIGNAL: "SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.EMAIL: "EMAIL_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.SMS: "SMS_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.MATTERMOST: "MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.MATRIX: "MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.DINGTALK: "DINGTALK_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.WECOM: "WECOM_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: "WECOM_CALLBACK_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.WEIXIN: "WEIXIN_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.BLUEBUBBLES: "BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS",
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Platform.YUANBAO: "YUANBAO_ALLOWED_USERS",
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}
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platform_group_user_env_map = {
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Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",
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}
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platform_group_chat_env_map = {
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Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS",
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Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",
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}
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platform_allow_all_map = {
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Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.WHATSAPP: "WHATSAPP_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.WHATSAPP_CLOUD: "WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.SIGNAL: "SIGNAL_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.EMAIL: "EMAIL_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.SMS: "SMS_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.MATTERMOST: "MATTERMOST_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.MATRIX: "MATRIX_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.DINGTALK: "DINGTALK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.WECOM: "WECOM_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: "WECOM_CALLBACK_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.WEIXIN: "WEIXIN_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.BLUEBUBBLES: "BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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Platform.YUANBAO: "YUANBAO_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
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}
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# Bots admitted by {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_BOTS bypass the human allowlist (#4466).
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platform_allow_bots_map = {
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Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS",
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Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOW_BOTS",
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}
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# Plugin platforms: check the registry for auth env var names
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if source.platform not in platform_env_map:
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try:
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from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
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entry = platform_registry.get(source.platform.value)
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if entry:
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if entry.allowed_users_env:
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platform_env_map[source.platform] = entry.allowed_users_env
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if entry.allow_all_env:
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platform_allow_all_map[source.platform] = entry.allow_all_env
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except Exception:
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pass
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# Per-platform allow-all flag (e.g., DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true)
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platform_allow_all_var = platform_allow_all_map.get(source.platform, "")
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if platform_allow_all_var and os.getenv(platform_allow_all_var, "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"}:
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return True
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# Adapter-verified role auth: the Discord adapter already confirmed the
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# user holds a role in DISCORD_ALLOWED_ROLES before dispatching the message.
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# Compare with ``is True`` so the real bool field authorizes while a
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# MagicMock source (test fixtures using ``object.__new__`` runners with
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# mock sources) does not auto-truthy through this gate (see pitfall #13).
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if getattr(source, "role_authorized", False) is True:
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return True
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if getattr(source, "is_bot", False):
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allow_bots_var = platform_allow_bots_map.get(source.platform)
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if allow_bots_var and os.getenv(allow_bots_var, "none").lower().strip() in {"mentions", "all"}:
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return True
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|
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# Check pairing store (always checked, regardless of allowlists)
|
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platform_name = source.platform.value if source.platform else ""
|
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if self.pairing_store.is_approved(platform_name, user_id):
|
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return True
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# Check platform-specific and global allowlists
|
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platform_allowlist = os.getenv(platform_env_map.get(source.platform, ""), "").strip()
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group_user_allowlist = ""
|
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group_chat_allowlist = ""
|
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if source.chat_type in {"group", "forum"}:
|
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group_user_allowlist = os.getenv(platform_group_user_env_map.get(source.platform, ""), "").strip()
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group_chat_allowlist = os.getenv(platform_group_chat_env_map.get(source.platform, ""), "").strip()
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global_allowlist = os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS", "").strip()
|
||||
|
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if not platform_allowlist and not group_user_allowlist and not group_chat_allowlist and not global_allowlist:
|
||||
# No env allowlist configured. Adapters that own their own
|
||||
# config-driven access policy (dm_policy / group_policy /
|
||||
# allow_from / group_allow_from) gate access at intake, so for those
|
||||
# platforms we can honor the adapter's decision instead of the
|
||||
# env-only default-deny below -- but ONLY when that decision was an
|
||||
# actual allowlist restriction.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The adapters default dm_policy / group_policy to "open", which
|
||||
# forwards EVERY sender. Reading "reached the gateway" as
|
||||
# authorization in that case would admit the whole external network
|
||||
# with no operator-configured allowlist -- the fail-open SECURITY.md
|
||||
# §2.6 forbids ("an allowlist is required for every enabled
|
||||
# network-exposed adapter ... code paths that fail open when no
|
||||
# allowlist is configured are code bugs"). "disabled" never
|
||||
# forwards, and "pairing" forwards unpaired DMs only so the gateway
|
||||
# can run its pairing handshake (the pairing-store check above
|
||||
# already denied this sender). So trust the adapter only when its
|
||||
# effective policy for THIS chat type is "allowlist"; for "open" /
|
||||
# "pairing" / anything else, fall through to default-deny, where
|
||||
# GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS, the per-platform {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_ALL_USERS
|
||||
# flag (checked above), and the pairing flow remain the explicit
|
||||
# opt-ins to broader access. (#34515 follow-up: trusting "open" was a
|
||||
# fail-open.)
|
||||
if self._adapter_enforces_own_access_policy(source.platform):
|
||||
if source.chat_type in {"group", "forum", "channel"}:
|
||||
effective_policy = self._adapter_group_policy(source.platform)
|
||||
if self._adapter_group_has_sender_allowlist(
|
||||
source.platform,
|
||||
source.chat_id,
|
||||
):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
else:
|
||||
effective_policy = self._adapter_dm_policy(source.platform)
|
||||
if effective_policy == "allowlist":
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# No allowlists configured -- check global allow-all flag
|
||||
return os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"}
|
||||
|
||||
# Telegram can optionally authorize group traffic by chat ID.
|
||||
# Keep this separate from TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS, which gates
|
||||
# the sender user ID for group/forum messages.
|
||||
if group_chat_allowlist and source.chat_type in {"group", "forum"} and source.chat_id:
|
||||
allowed_group_ids = {
|
||||
chat_id.strip() for chat_id in group_chat_allowlist.split(",") if chat_id.strip()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if "*" in allowed_group_ids or source.chat_id in allowed_group_ids:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
# Backward-compat shim for #15027: prior to PR #17686,
|
||||
# TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS was (mis)used as a chat-ID allowlist.
|
||||
# Values starting with "-" are Telegram chat IDs, not user IDs, so if
|
||||
# users still have those in TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS we honor them
|
||||
# as chat IDs and warn once. The correct var is now
|
||||
# TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
source.platform == Platform.TELEGRAM
|
||||
and group_user_allowlist
|
||||
and source.chat_type in {"group", "forum"}
|
||||
and source.chat_id
|
||||
):
|
||||
legacy_chat_ids = {
|
||||
v.strip()
|
||||
for v in group_user_allowlist.split(",")
|
||||
if v.strip().startswith("-")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if legacy_chat_ids:
|
||||
if not getattr(self, "_warned_telegram_group_users_legacy", False):
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
"TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS contains chat-ID-shaped values "
|
||||
"(%s). Treating them as chat IDs for backward compatibility. "
|
||||
"Move chat IDs to TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS — the _USERS var "
|
||||
"is now for sender user IDs.",
|
||||
",".join(sorted(legacy_chat_ids)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._warned_telegram_group_users_legacy = True
|
||||
if source.chat_id in legacy_chat_ids:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if user is in any allowlist. In group/forum chats,
|
||||
# TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS is the scoped allowlist and should not
|
||||
# imply DM access; TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS remains the platform-wide
|
||||
# allowlist and still works everywhere for backward compatibility.
|
||||
allowed_ids = set()
|
||||
if platform_allowlist:
|
||||
allowed_ids.update(uid.strip() for uid in platform_allowlist.split(",") if uid.strip())
|
||||
if group_user_allowlist:
|
||||
allowed_ids.update(uid.strip() for uid in group_user_allowlist.split(",") if uid.strip())
|
||||
if global_allowlist:
|
||||
allowed_ids.update(uid.strip() for uid in global_allowlist.split(",") if uid.strip())
|
||||
|
||||
# "*" in any allowlist means allow everyone (consistent with
|
||||
# SIGNAL_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS precedent)
|
||||
if "*" in allowed_ids:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
check_ids = {user_id}
|
||||
if "@" in user_id:
|
||||
check_ids.add(user_id.split("@")[0])
|
||||
|
||||
# WhatsApp: resolve phone↔LID aliases from bridge session mapping files
|
||||
if source.platform == Platform.WHATSAPP:
|
||||
normalized_allowed_ids = set()
|
||||
for allowed_id in allowed_ids:
|
||||
normalized_allowed_ids.update(_expand_whatsapp_auth_aliases(allowed_id))
|
||||
if normalized_allowed_ids:
|
||||
allowed_ids = normalized_allowed_ids
|
||||
|
||||
check_ids.update(_expand_whatsapp_auth_aliases(user_id))
|
||||
normalized_user_id = _normalize_whatsapp_identifier(user_id)
|
||||
if normalized_user_id:
|
||||
check_ids.add(normalized_user_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# SimpleX: SIMPLEX_ALLOWED_USERS accepts either the numeric contactId
|
||||
# or the contact's display name. The adapter sets user_id=contactId for
|
||||
# stability across renames, but the SimpleX UI never surfaces the
|
||||
# numeric id — operators only see display names, so that's what they
|
||||
# naturally put in the env var. Match both so the allowlist works
|
||||
# regardless of which form was chosen.
|
||||
# Plugin platform: compare by value since Platform.SIMPLEX is not a
|
||||
# hardcoded enum member (it's a dynamic plugin platform).
|
||||
if (
|
||||
source.platform is not None
|
||||
and source.platform.value == "simplex"
|
||||
and source.user_name
|
||||
):
|
||||
check_ids.add(source.user_name)
|
||||
|
||||
return bool(check_ids & allowed_ids)
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_unauthorized_dm_behavior(self, platform: Optional[Platform]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return how unauthorized DMs should be handled for a platform.
|
||||
|
||||
Resolution order:
|
||||
1. Explicit per-platform ``unauthorized_dm_behavior`` in config — always wins.
|
||||
2. Explicit global ``unauthorized_dm_behavior`` in config — wins when no per-platform.
|
||||
3. When an allowlist (``PLATFORM_ALLOWED_USERS``,
|
||||
``PLATFORM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS`` / ``PLATFORM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS``,
|
||||
or ``GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS``) is configured, default to ``"ignore"`` —
|
||||
the allowlist signals that the owner has deliberately restricted
|
||||
access; spamming unknown contacts with pairing codes is both noisy
|
||||
and a potential info-leak. (#9337)
|
||||
4. No allowlist and no explicit config → ``"pair"`` (open-gateway default).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
config = getattr(self, "config", None)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check for an explicit per-platform override first.
|
||||
if config and hasattr(config, "get_unauthorized_dm_behavior") and platform:
|
||||
platform_cfg = config.platforms.get(platform) if hasattr(config, "platforms") else None
|
||||
if platform_cfg and "unauthorized_dm_behavior" in getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", {}):
|
||||
# Operator explicitly configured behavior for this platform — respect it.
|
||||
return config.get_unauthorized_dm_behavior(platform)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check for an explicit global config override.
|
||||
if config and hasattr(config, "unauthorized_dm_behavior"):
|
||||
if config.unauthorized_dm_behavior != "pair": # non-default → explicit override
|
||||
return config.unauthorized_dm_behavior
|
||||
|
||||
# Config-driven dm_policy (WeCom / Weixin / Yuanbao / QQBot). An
|
||||
# allowlist or disabled DM policy means the operator restricted access,
|
||||
# so unauthorized DMs should be dropped silently rather than answered
|
||||
# with a pairing code. An explicit pairing policy opts back into codes.
|
||||
if platform and config and hasattr(config, "platforms"):
|
||||
platform_cfg = config.platforms.get(platform)
|
||||
extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None
|
||||
if isinstance(extra, dict):
|
||||
dm_policy = str(extra.get("dm_policy") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if dm_policy == "pairing":
|
||||
return "pair"
|
||||
if dm_policy in {"allowlist", "disabled"}:
|
||||
return "ignore"
|
||||
|
||||
# No explicit override. Fall back to allowlist-aware default:
|
||||
# if any allowlist is configured for this platform, silently drop
|
||||
# unauthorized messages instead of sending pairing codes.
|
||||
if platform:
|
||||
platform_env_map = {
|
||||
Platform.TELEGRAM: "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.DISCORD: "DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.WHATSAPP: "WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.WHATSAPP_CLOUD: "WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.SLACK: "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.SIGNAL: "SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.EMAIL: "EMAIL_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.SMS: "SMS_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.MATTERMOST: "MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.MATRIX: "MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.DINGTALK: "DINGTALK_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.FEISHU: "FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.WECOM: "WECOM_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: "WECOM_CALLBACK_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.WEIXIN: "WEIXIN_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.BLUEBUBBLES: "BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
Platform.QQBOT: "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
}
|
||||
platform_group_env_map = {
|
||||
Platform.TELEGRAM: (
|
||||
"TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",
|
||||
"TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS",
|
||||
),
|
||||
Platform.QQBOT: ("QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if os.getenv(platform_env_map.get(platform, ""), "").strip():
|
||||
return "ignore"
|
||||
for env_key in platform_group_env_map.get(platform, ()):
|
||||
if os.getenv(env_key, "").strip():
|
||||
return "ignore"
|
||||
|
||||
if os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS", "").strip():
|
||||
return "ignore"
|
||||
|
||||
return "pair"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user