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Hermes-agent
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Zakaria
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# Engagement Authorization
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Fill out before any active testing. Save to `engagement/authorization.md`.
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---
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**Engagement ID:** <UUID or short slug>
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**Operator:** <name of the person driving this Hermes session>
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**Date opened:** <ISO 8601 timestamp>
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**Engagement window:** <start ISO timestamp> through <end ISO timestamp>
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## Target
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- Primary URL(s):
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- https://...
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- Primary IP(s):
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- X.X.X.X
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- Hostnames covered:
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- host.example.com
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- api.host.example.com
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- Networks covered (CIDR):
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- 10.0.0.0/24 (internal lab)
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## Authorization Basis
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(Pick one — record evidence in writing for anything but ownership.)
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- [ ] Operator owns the application and infrastructure being tested.
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- [ ] Written authorization from <name, role, organization, date>.
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Document stored at: <path or link to signed authorization>.
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- [ ] Hermes Agent dashboard, running on this same workstation, used
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as a self-test target. Operator confirms no other user is
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connected to the dashboard instance during the engagement.
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## Out of Scope (must not be tested)
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- Production systems unless explicitly listed above
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- Third-party APIs / SaaS the application calls into
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- Other tenants if the target is multi-tenant
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- Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.) unless explicitly
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included above
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- Destructive payloads (DROP, DELETE, file writes outside test
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directories) without per-payload approval
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- Active social engineering, phishing, physical security
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## Constraints
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- Rate limit: <N> req/s per host. Default 5/s (200ms gap).
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- Hours: <none> | <only between HH:MM and HH:MM local>
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- Notify-before for: <list of categories> e.g. "any payload that
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writes data," "any traffic that touches the auth endpoint after
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10pm local"
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## Acknowledgement
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By approving this engagement, the operator confirms:
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1. The targets listed above are authorized for active testing by the
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listed authorization basis.
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2. Testing may produce HTTP 4xx/5xx responses, log noise, alert
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notifications, and rate-limit triggers in monitoring systems.
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3. The operator is responsible for any consequences of testing
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targets that are NOT correctly authorized.
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4. The operator will revoke authorization (by stopping the agent) if
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the scope changes, the time window ends, or any unexpected
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off-scope behavior is observed.
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**Operator signature (typed name):** ________________
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**Confirmed at:** <ISO 8601 timestamp>
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{
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"schema": "hermes-web-pentest exploitation-queue v1",
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"vuln_class": "injection|xss|auth|authz|ssrf|infra",
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"generated_at": "ISO 8601 timestamp",
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"engagement_id": "<engagement slug>",
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"candidates": [
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{
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"id": "INJ-001",
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"vuln_subclass": "sql_injection|command_injection|path_traversal|ssti|lfi|rfi|deserialization",
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"endpoint": {
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"method": "GET",
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"url": "https://target.example/api/items",
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"parameter": "id",
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"location": "query|body|header|cookie|path"
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},
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"source_ref": "path/to/file.py:123",
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"slot_type": "SQL-val|CMD-argument|PATH-segment|...",
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"suspected_defense": "none|parameterized|escape|allowlist|...",
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"verdict": "identified|partial|confirmed|critical|false_positive",
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"confidence": 0.7,
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"witness_payload": "' AND 1=1--",
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"witness_response_signal": "row count change | timing | reflected marker | ...",
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"bypass_attempts": [
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{
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"payload": "%2527%20OR%201=1--",
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"blocked": true,
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"notes": "WAF returned 403 on encoded variant"
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}
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],
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"notes": "free text",
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"next_action": "send_witness | escalate_to_L3 | classify_FP | abort_scope_concern"
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}
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]
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}
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# Penetration Test Report
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**Target:** <name + URL>
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**Engagement ID:** <slug>
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**Engagement window:** <start> – <end>
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**Operator:** <name>
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**Tester:** Hermes Agent + operator
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**Report generated:** <ISO 8601 timestamp>
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---
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## Executive Summary
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<2-4 paragraph plain-language summary. Focus on:
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- What was tested
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- What was found (count by severity)
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- Most critical finding in one sentence
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- High-level remediation recommendation>
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| Severity | Count |
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|----------|-------|
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| Critical | 0 |
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| High | 0 |
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| Medium | 0 |
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| Low | 0 |
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| Info | 0 |
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---
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## Engagement Scope
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In-scope targets (from `engagement/scope.txt`):
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- <host or CIDR>
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Out of scope: see `engagement/authorization.md`.
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Authorization basis: see `engagement/authorization.md`.
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## Methodology
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Approach was based on the Hermes `web-pentest` skill (a Hermes Agent
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adaptation of the OWASP Testing Guide with elements of Shannon's
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proof-based methodology). Phases performed:
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- [ ] Pre-recon (source code review)
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- [ ] Recon (live, read-only)
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- [ ] Vulnerability analysis (one queue per OWASP class)
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- [ ] Exploitation (proof-based)
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- [ ] Reporting
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Tools used: <nmap, whatweb, curl, Hermes browser tool, ...>.
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## Findings (L3/L4 — Verified Exploitable)
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> Every finding in this section has a reproducible proof-of-concept.
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> L1/L2 candidates that were not promoted to confirmed exploitation
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> are listed in the "Not Exploited" section.
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### F-001: <Title>
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- **Severity:** Critical | High | Medium | Low
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- **CVSS 3.1 vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/...`
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- **CVSS 3.1 base score:** N.N
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- **CWE:** CWE-XX
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- **Affected endpoint(s):** `GET https://target.example/api/...`
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- **Affected parameter(s):** `id`
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- **Discovered:** <date>
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#### Description
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<What is the bug, in plain language.>
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#### Proof
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Request:
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```http
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GET /api/items?id=1%27%20OR%201=1-- HTTP/1.1
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Host: target.example
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Cookie: session=...
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```
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Response (excerpt):
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```http
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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Content-Type: application/json
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```
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#### Reproduction
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```bash
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curl -sS 'https://target.example/api/items?id=1%27%20OR%201=1--' \
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-H 'Cookie: session=YOUR_TEST_SESSION'
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```
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#### Impact
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<What an attacker gains. Be specific. "Could allow data extraction" is
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worse than "Allowed extraction of all 4 columns from the `users` table
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in our test (PoC redacted PII), and the same query shape applies to
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any other parameter using the same code path.">
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#### Remediation
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<Specific, actionable. "Use parameterized queries" is better than
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"sanitize inputs." Include code example if possible.>
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#### Verification (post-fix)
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To verify the fix, re-run the reproduction command. The response
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should be HTTP 400, an empty result, or a result containing only the
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record matching `id=1` literally.
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---
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(repeat per finding)
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---
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## Not Exploited (L1/L2 candidates)
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Candidates that pattern-matched but were not promoted to L3 within
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the engagement window. Listed for completeness; do NOT report these
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as confirmed vulnerabilities.
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| ID | Class | Endpoint | Status | Why not promoted |
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|----|-------|----------|--------|------------------|
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| INJ-002 | SQLi | `/api/search?q=` | L2 partial | Bypass set exhausted; appears to use parameterized binding |
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| XSS-003 | reflected | `/error?msg=` | L1 identified | Could not produce executable context — output is JSON-encoded |
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---
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## Out-of-Scope Observations
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(Findings or hints noticed but NOT tested because they were outside
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scope. These are documentation, not findings. The operator decides
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whether to extend scope and re-test.)
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- The application sends to `https://third-party.example/...` — payload
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could trigger third-party-side bugs but third party is out of scope.
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---
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## Limitations
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What was NOT tested, and why:
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- <Class of test>: <reason>
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Examples:
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- DDoS / stress testing — explicitly excluded by engagement scope.
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- Authenticated business-logic flows requiring billing — no test
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credit card available.
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- Mobile API surfaces — out of scope.
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---
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## Appendices
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- A: `engagement/authorization.md` — authorization on file
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- B: `engagement/scope.txt` — machine-readable scope
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- C: `engagement/request-log.jsonl` — every active request issued
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- D: `findings/*-queue.json` — per-class candidate queues
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- E: `evidence/` — raw captures (request/response pairs)
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---
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## Disclaimer
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This report describes vulnerabilities discovered during a
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time-bounded penetration test against the listed targets within the
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listed scope. Absence of a finding in this report does not imply the
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target is secure; only that no exploitable issue was found in scope
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X within time T using methods Y.
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X within time T using methods Y.
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