Hermes-agent

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+# Penetration Test Report
+
+**Target:** <name + URL>
+**Engagement ID:** <slug>
+**Engagement window:** <start> – <end>
+**Operator:** <name>
+**Tester:** Hermes Agent + operator
+**Report generated:** <ISO 8601 timestamp>
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+<2-4 paragraph plain-language summary. Focus on:
+ - What was tested
+ - What was found (count by severity)
+ - Most critical finding in one sentence
+ - High-level remediation recommendation>
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| Critical | 0     |
+| High     | 0     |
+| Medium   | 0     |
+| Low      | 0     |
+| Info     | 0     |
+
+---
+
+## Engagement Scope
+
+In-scope targets (from `engagement/scope.txt`):
+
+- <host or CIDR>
+
+Out of scope: see `engagement/authorization.md`.
+
+Authorization basis: see `engagement/authorization.md`.
+
+## Methodology
+
+Approach was based on the Hermes `web-pentest` skill (a Hermes Agent
+adaptation of the OWASP Testing Guide with elements of Shannon's
+proof-based methodology). Phases performed:
+
+- [ ] Pre-recon (source code review)
+- [ ] Recon (live, read-only)
+- [ ] Vulnerability analysis (one queue per OWASP class)
+- [ ] Exploitation (proof-based)
+- [ ] Reporting
+
+Tools used: <nmap, whatweb, curl, Hermes browser tool, ...>.
+
+## Findings (L3/L4 — Verified Exploitable)
+
+> Every finding in this section has a reproducible proof-of-concept.
+> L1/L2 candidates that were not promoted to confirmed exploitation
+> are listed in the "Not Exploited" section.
+
+### F-001: <Title>
+
+- **Severity:** Critical | High | Medium | Low
+- **CVSS 3.1 vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/...`
+- **CVSS 3.1 base score:** N.N
+- **CWE:** CWE-XX
+- **Affected endpoint(s):** `GET https://target.example/api/...`
+- **Affected parameter(s):** `id`
+- **Discovered:** <date>
+
+#### Description
+
+<What is the bug, in plain language.>
+
+#### Proof
+
+Request:
+
+```http
+GET /api/items?id=1%27%20OR%201=1-- HTTP/1.1
+Host: target.example
+Cookie: session=...
+```
+
+Response (excerpt):
+
+```http
+HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+```
+
+#### Reproduction
+
+```bash
+curl -sS 'https://target.example/api/items?id=1%27%20OR%201=1--' \
+     -H 'Cookie: session=YOUR_TEST_SESSION'
+```
+
+#### Impact
+
+<What an attacker gains. Be specific. "Could allow data extraction" is
+worse than "Allowed extraction of all 4 columns from the `users` table
+in our test (PoC redacted PII), and the same query shape applies to
+any other parameter using the same code path.">
+
+#### Remediation
+
+<Specific, actionable. "Use parameterized queries" is better than
+"sanitize inputs." Include code example if possible.>
+
+#### Verification (post-fix)
+
+To verify the fix, re-run the reproduction command. The response
+should be HTTP 400, an empty result, or a result containing only the
+record matching `id=1` literally.
+
+---
+
+(repeat per finding)
+
+---
+
+## Not Exploited (L1/L2 candidates)
+
+Candidates that pattern-matched but were not promoted to L3 within
+the engagement window. Listed for completeness; do NOT report these
+as confirmed vulnerabilities.
+
+| ID | Class | Endpoint | Status | Why not promoted |
+|----|-------|----------|--------|------------------|
+| INJ-002 | SQLi | `/api/search?q=` | L2 partial | Bypass set exhausted; appears to use parameterized binding |
+| XSS-003 | reflected | `/error?msg=` | L1 identified | Could not produce executable context — output is JSON-encoded |
+
+---
+
+## Out-of-Scope Observations
+
+(Findings or hints noticed but NOT tested because they were outside
+scope. These are documentation, not findings. The operator decides
+whether to extend scope and re-test.)
+
+- The application sends to `https://third-party.example/...` — payload
+  could trigger third-party-side bugs but third party is out of scope.
+
+---
+
+## Limitations
+
+What was NOT tested, and why:
+
+- <Class of test>: <reason>
+
+Examples:
+- DDoS / stress testing — explicitly excluded by engagement scope.
+- Authenticated business-logic flows requiring billing — no test
+  credit card available.
+- Mobile API surfaces — out of scope.
+
+---
+
+## Appendices
+
+- A: `engagement/authorization.md` — authorization on file
+- B: `engagement/scope.txt` — machine-readable scope
+- C: `engagement/request-log.jsonl` — every active request issued
+- D: `findings/*-queue.json` — per-class candidate queues
+- E: `evidence/` — raw captures (request/response pairs)
+
+---
+
+## Disclaimer
+
+This report describes vulnerabilities discovered during a
+time-bounded penetration test against the listed targets within the
+listed scope. Absence of a finding in this report does not imply the
+target is secure; only that no exploitable issue was found in scope
+X within time T using methods Y.
+X within time T using methods Y.