fix(api): harden sign-in throttling, OIDC authorization and auth state
- Key login throttling on the real peer address; read X-Forwarded-For only from FLOCI_UI_TRUSTED_PROXIES (right-most untrusted hop). Add a per-IP limit across usernames so one attacker can no longer lock out the admin. - Require an OIDC allow-list (FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS / _EMAILS, or FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true); fall back to UserInfo for groups when the ID token omits them. Redirect IdP and token errors to /login instead of returning 500s; cache discovery and JWKS. - Sweep expired sessions, attempts and pending OIDC requests every 60s, cap each map, and throttle OIDC sign-in starts per IP. - Fix the .ts import extension that broke the API type-check. - Add auth.test.ts and document the new settings.
This commit is contained in:
+148
-32
@@ -1,15 +1,27 @@
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import {timingSafeEqual} from 'node:crypto'
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import {createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify} from 'jose'
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import {BlockList, isIP} from 'node:net'
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import {createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify, type JWTPayload} from 'jose'
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import type {Context, MiddlewareHandler} from 'hono'
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import {getConnInfo} from 'hono/bun'
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import {deleteCookie, getCookie, setCookie} from 'hono/cookie'
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import {renderLoginPage} from './loginPage.ts'
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import {renderLoginPage} from './loginPage'
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const SESSION_COOKIE = 'floci_ui_session'
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const CSRF_COOKIE = 'floci_ui_csrf'
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const LOGIN_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60_000
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const LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = 5
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const LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_PER_IP = 20
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const OIDC_STARTS_PER_IP = 30
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const OIDC_REQUEST_TTL_MS = 10 * 60_000
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const OIDC_DISCOVERY_TTL_MS = 60 * 60_000
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const SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000
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const MAX_SESSIONS = 1_000
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const MAX_OIDC_REQUESTS = 1_000
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const MAX_ATTEMPTS = 10_000
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type AuthConfig = {
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type OidcConfig = {issuer: string; clientId: string; clientSecret: string; publicBaseUrl: string; allowedGroups: string[]; allowedEmails: string[]; allowAllUsers: boolean}
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export type AuthConfig = {
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mode: 'local' | 'oidc'
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adminUser?: string
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passwordHash?: string
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@@ -17,15 +29,19 @@ type AuthConfig = {
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idleTimeoutMs: number
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absoluteTimeoutMs: number
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secureCookies: boolean
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oidc?: {issuer: string; clientId: string; clientSecret: string; publicBaseUrl: string}
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trustedProxies: BlockList | null
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oidc?: OidcConfig
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}
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type Session = {username: string; createdAt: number; lastSeenAt: number; csrfToken: string}
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type Attempt = {count: number; firstAt: number; lockedUntil: number}
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type OidcDiscovery = {authorization_endpoint: string; token_endpoint: string; jwks_uri: string; userinfo_endpoint?: string}
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const sessions = new Map<string, Session>()
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const attempts = new Map<string, Attempt>()
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const oidcRequests = new Map<string, {nonce: string; verifier: string; returnTo: string; expiresAt: number}>()
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const discoveries = new Map<string, {document: OidcDiscovery; expiresAt: number}>()
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const jwksSets = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>()
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export function authConfig(env = process.env): AuthConfig {
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const mode = (env.FLOCI_UI_AUTH_MODE ?? 'local') as 'local' | 'oidc'
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@@ -35,17 +51,26 @@ export function authConfig(env = process.env): AuthConfig {
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const idleTimeoutMs = seconds(env.FLOCI_UI_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, 1800)
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const absoluteTimeoutMs = seconds(env.FLOCI_UI_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, 28_800)
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if (idleTimeoutMs > absoluteTimeoutMs) throw new Error('FLOCI_UI_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS cannot exceed FLOCI_UI_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS')
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const secureCookies = env.FLOCI_UI_SECURE_COOKIES !== 'false'
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const trustedProxies = parseTrustedProxies(env.FLOCI_UI_TRUSTED_PROXIES)
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if (mode === 'oidc') {
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const issuer = `${required(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ISSUER, 'FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ISSUER').replace(/\/$/, '')}/`
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return {mode, secret, idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs, secureCookies: env.FLOCI_UI_SECURE_COOKIES !== 'false', oidc: {issuer, clientId: required(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_ID, 'FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_ID'), clientSecret: required(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, 'FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET'), publicBaseUrl: required(env.FLOCI_UI_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, 'FLOCI_UI_PUBLIC_BASE_URL').replace(/\/$/, '')}}
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const allowedGroups = list(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS)
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const allowedEmails = list(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOWED_EMAILS).map((email) => email.toLowerCase())
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const allowAllUsers = env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOW_ALL_USERS === 'true'
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if (!allowAllUsers && allowedGroups.length === 0 && allowedEmails.length === 0) {
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throw new Error('OIDC mode requires FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS or FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOWED_EMAILS (or FLOCI_UI_OIDC_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true to admit every identity-provider user)')
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}
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return {mode, secret, idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs, secureCookies, trustedProxies, oidc: {issuer, clientId: required(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_ID, 'FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_ID'), clientSecret: required(env.FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, 'FLOCI_UI_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET'), publicBaseUrl: required(env.FLOCI_UI_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, 'FLOCI_UI_PUBLIC_BASE_URL').replace(/\/$/, ''), allowedGroups, allowedEmails, allowAllUsers}}
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}
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const adminUser = required(env.FLOCI_UI_ADMIN_USER, 'FLOCI_UI_ADMIN_USER')
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const passwordHash = required(env.FLOCI_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH, 'FLOCI_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH')
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if (!passwordHash.startsWith('$argon2id$') && !passwordHash.startsWith('$2')) throw new Error('FLOCI_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH must be an argon2id or bcrypt hash')
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return {mode, adminUser, passwordHash, secret, idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs, secureCookies: env.FLOCI_UI_SECURE_COOKIES !== 'false'}
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return {mode, adminUser, passwordHash, secret, idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs, secureCookies, trustedProxies}
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}
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export function authMiddleware(config: AuthConfig): MiddlewareHandler {
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setInterval(() => sweepExpired(config), SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS).unref()
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return async (c, next) => {
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const styleNonce = Buffer.from(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16))).toString('base64url')
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c.set('styleNonce', styleNonce)
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@@ -81,29 +106,41 @@ async function login(c: Context, config: AuthConfig): Promise<Response> {
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const password = typeof form.password === 'string' ? form.password : ''
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const csrf = typeof form.csrf === 'string' ? form.csrf : c.req.header('x-floci-csrf') ?? ''
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if (!sameToken(getCookie(c, CSRF_COOKIE), csrf)) return loginFailure(c, 403)
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const key = `${clientIp(c)}:${username.toLowerCase()}`
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if (locked(key)) return loginFailure(c, 429)
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const ip = clientIp(c, config)
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const key = `login:${ip}:${username.toLowerCase()}`
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const ipKey = `login-ip:${ip}`
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if (locked(key) || locked(ipKey)) return loginFailure(c, 429)
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const usernameMatches = sameToken(username, config.adminUser)
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const passwordMatches = await Bun.password.verify(password, config.passwordHash!)
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if (!usernameMatches || !passwordMatches) {
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recordFailure(key)
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recordFailure(key, LOGIN_ATTEMPTS)
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recordFailure(ipKey, LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_PER_IP)
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return loginFailure(c, 401)
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}
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attempts.delete(key)
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await createSession(c, config, config.adminUser!)
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if (!await createSession(c, config, config.adminUser!)) return c.json({error: 'Too many active sessions. Try again later.'}, 503)
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const redirectTo = safeReturnTo(typeof form.returnTo === 'string' ? form.returnTo : undefined)
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return acceptsHtml(c) ? c.redirect(redirectTo, 302) : c.json({ok: true, redirectTo})
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}
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async function oidcLogin(c: Context, config: AuthConfig): Promise<Response> {
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if (!config.oidc) return c.notFound()
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const discovery = await oidcDiscovery(config.oidc.issuer)
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const startKey = `oidc-start:${clientIp(c, config)}`
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if (locked(startKey)) return c.redirect('/login?error=throttled', 302)
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recordFailure(startKey, OIDC_STARTS_PER_IP)
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let discovery: OidcDiscovery
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try {
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discovery = await oidcDiscovery(config.oidc.issuer)
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} catch {
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return c.redirect('/login?error=unavailable', 302)
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}
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const state = crypto.randomUUID()
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const nonce = crypto.randomUUID()
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const verifier = Buffer.from(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))).toString('base64url')
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const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(verifier))
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const challenge = Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url')
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oidcRequests.set(state, {nonce, verifier, returnTo: safeReturnTo(c.req.query('returnTo')), expiresAt: Date.now() + 10 * 60_000})
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if (oidcRequests.size >= MAX_OIDC_REQUESTS) oidcRequests.delete(oidcRequests.keys().next().value!)
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oidcRequests.set(state, {nonce, verifier, returnTo: safeReturnTo(c.req.query('returnTo')), expiresAt: Date.now() + OIDC_REQUEST_TTL_MS})
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const url = new URL(discovery.authorization_endpoint)
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url.search = new URLSearchParams({response_type: 'code', client_id: config.oidc.clientId, redirect_uri: `${config.oidc.publicBaseUrl}/api/auth/oidc/callback`, scope: 'openid profile email', state, nonce, code_challenge: challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256'}).toString()
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return c.redirect(url.toString(), 302)
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@@ -112,29 +149,75 @@ async function oidcLogin(c: Context, config: AuthConfig): Promise<Response> {
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async function oidcCallback(c: Context, config: AuthConfig): Promise<Response> {
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if (!config.oidc) return c.notFound()
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const state = c.req.query('state')
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const code = c.req.query('code')
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const request = state ? oidcRequests.get(state) : undefined
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if (!state || !code || !request || request.expiresAt < Date.now()) return c.json({error: 'Invalid OIDC callback'}, 400)
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oidcRequests.delete(state)
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const discovery = await oidcDiscovery(config.oidc.issuer)
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const tokenResponse = await fetch(discovery.token_endpoint, {method: 'POST', headers: {'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}, body: new URLSearchParams({grant_type: 'authorization_code', code, redirect_uri: `${config.oidc.publicBaseUrl}/api/auth/oidc/callback`, client_id: config.oidc.clientId, client_secret: config.oidc.clientSecret, code_verifier: request.verifier})})
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const tokens = await tokenResponse.json() as {id_token?: string}
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if (!tokenResponse.ok || !tokens.id_token) return c.json({error: 'OIDC token exchange failed'}, 401)
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const jwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(discovery.jwks_uri))
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const verified = await jwtVerify(tokens.id_token, jwks, {issuer: config.oidc.issuer, audience: config.oidc.clientId})
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if (verified.payload.nonce !== request.nonce) return c.json({error: 'OIDC nonce validation failed'}, 401)
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const username = String(verified.payload.preferred_username ?? verified.payload.email ?? verified.payload.sub ?? '')
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if (!username) return c.json({error: 'OIDC identity has no usable subject'}, 401)
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await createSession(c, config, username)
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if (state) oidcRequests.delete(state)
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if (c.req.query('error')) return c.redirect(`/login?error=${c.req.query('error') === 'access_denied' ? 'denied' : 'failed'}`, 302)
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const code = c.req.query('code')
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if (!code || !request || request.expiresAt < Date.now()) return c.redirect('/login?error=expired', 302)
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let claims: JWTPayload
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try {
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claims = await verifiedOidcClaims(config.oidc, code, request)
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} catch {
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return c.redirect('/login?error=failed', 302)
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}
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if (!oidcUserAllowed(claims, config.oidc)) return c.redirect('/login?error=forbidden', 302)
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const username = String(claims.preferred_username ?? claims.email ?? claims.sub ?? '')
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if (!username) return c.redirect('/login?error=failed', 302)
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if (!await createSession(c, config, username)) return c.redirect('/login?error=unavailable', 302)
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attempts.delete(`oidc-start:${clientIp(c, config)}`)
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return c.redirect(request.returnTo, 302)
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}
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async function createSession(c: Context, config: AuthConfig, username: string): Promise<void> {
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async function verifiedOidcClaims(oidc: OidcConfig, code: string, request: {nonce: string; verifier: string}): Promise<JWTPayload> {
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const discovery = await oidcDiscovery(oidc.issuer)
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const tokenResponse = await fetch(discovery.token_endpoint, {method: 'POST', headers: {'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}, body: new URLSearchParams({grant_type: 'authorization_code', code, redirect_uri: `${oidc.publicBaseUrl}/api/auth/oidc/callback`, client_id: oidc.clientId, client_secret: oidc.clientSecret, code_verifier: request.verifier})})
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const tokens = await tokenResponse.json() as {id_token?: string; access_token?: string}
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if (!tokenResponse.ok || !tokens.id_token) throw new Error('OIDC token exchange failed')
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const {payload} = await jwtVerify(tokens.id_token, jwksFor(discovery.jwks_uri), {issuer: oidc.issuer, audience: oidc.clientId})
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if (payload.nonce !== request.nonce) throw new Error('OIDC nonce validation failed')
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if (oidc.allowedGroups.length === 0 || 'groups' in payload || !tokens.access_token || !discovery.userinfo_endpoint) return payload
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// Providers may leave profile claims such as `groups` out of the ID token; the
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// UserInfo response is authoritative for them once its `sub` matches.
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const userinfoResponse = await fetch(discovery.userinfo_endpoint, {headers: {authorization: `Bearer ${tokens.access_token}`}})
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if (!userinfoResponse.ok) throw new Error('OIDC userinfo request failed')
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const userinfo = await userinfoResponse.json() as JWTPayload
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if (userinfo.sub !== payload.sub) throw new Error('OIDC userinfo subject mismatch')
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return {...userinfo, ...payload, groups: userinfo.groups}
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}
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function oidcUserAllowed(claims: JWTPayload, oidc: OidcConfig): boolean {
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if (oidc.allowAllUsers) return true
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const groups = Array.isArray(claims.groups) ? claims.groups.filter((group): group is string => typeof group === 'string') : []
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if (groups.some((group) => oidc.allowedGroups.includes(group))) return true
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const email = typeof claims.email === 'string' ? claims.email.toLowerCase() : ''
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return claims.email_verified === true && email !== '' && oidc.allowedEmails.includes(email)
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}
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async function createSession(c: Context, config: AuthConfig, username: string): Promise<boolean> {
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if (sessions.size >= MAX_SESSIONS) sweepExpired(config)
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if (sessions.size >= MAX_SESSIONS) return false
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const id = crypto.randomUUID()
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const csrfToken = crypto.randomUUID()
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sessions.set(id, {username, createdAt: Date.now(), lastSeenAt: Date.now(), csrfToken})
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setCookie(c, SESSION_COOKIE, `${id}.${await signature(id, config.secret)}`, cookieOptions(config))
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setCookie(c, CSRF_COOKIE, csrfToken, {...cookieOptions(config), httpOnly: false})
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return true
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}
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export function sweepExpired(config: AuthConfig, now = Date.now()): void {
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for (const [id, session] of sessions) {
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if (now - session.lastSeenAt > config.idleTimeoutMs || now - session.createdAt > config.absoluteTimeoutMs) sessions.delete(id)
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}
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for (const [state, request] of oidcRequests) {
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if (request.expiresAt < now) oidcRequests.delete(state)
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}
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for (const [key, attempt] of attempts) {
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if (attempt.lockedUntil <= now && now - attempt.firstAt > LOGIN_WINDOW_MS) attempts.delete(key)
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}
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}
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export function authStateSizes(): {sessions: number; attempts: number; oidcRequests: number} {
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return {sessions: sessions.size, attempts: attempts.size, oidcRequests: oidcRequests.size}
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}
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async function logout(c: Context, config: AuthConfig): Promise<Response> {
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@@ -199,6 +282,9 @@ function loginErrorMessage(code: string | undefined): string | null {
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if (!code) return null
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if (code === 'denied') return 'Your sign-in was cancelled. Please try again when you are ready.'
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if (code === 'expired') return 'Your sign-in session expired. Please start again.'
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if (code === 'forbidden') return 'Your account is not allowed to access this console.'
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if (code === 'throttled') return 'Too many sign-in attempts. Try again later.'
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if (code === 'unavailable') return 'Sign-in is temporarily unavailable. Please try again shortly.'
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return 'We could not complete your sign-in. Please try again.'
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}
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@@ -211,13 +297,43 @@ function stateChanging(method: string): boolean { return !['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIO
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function cookieOptions(config: AuthConfig) { return {httpOnly: true, secure: config.secureCookies, sameSite: 'Lax' as const, path: '/', maxAge: Math.floor(config.absoluteTimeoutMs / 1000)} }
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function seconds(value: string | undefined, fallback: number): number { const parsed = Number(value ?? fallback); if (!Number.isInteger(parsed) || parsed < 60) throw new Error('Session timeout values must be whole seconds of at least 60'); return parsed * 1000 }
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function required(value: string | undefined, name: string): string { if (!value?.trim()) throw new Error(`${name} is required`); return value }
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async function oidcDiscovery(issuer: string): Promise<{authorization_endpoint: string; token_endpoint: string; jwks_uri: string}> { const response = await fetch(`${issuer}.well-known/openid-configuration`); if (!response.ok) throw new Error('Unable to load OIDC discovery document'); return response.json() }
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function list(value: string | undefined): string[] { return (value ?? '').split(',').map((entry) => entry.trim()).filter(Boolean) }
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async function oidcDiscovery(issuer: string): Promise<OidcDiscovery> { const cached = discoveries.get(issuer); if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) return cached.document; const response = await fetch(`${issuer}.well-known/openid-configuration`); if (!response.ok) throw new Error('Unable to load OIDC discovery document'); const document = await response.json() as OidcDiscovery; discoveries.set(issuer, {document, expiresAt: Date.now() + OIDC_DISCOVERY_TTL_MS}); return document }
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function jwksFor(uri: string): ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> { let jwks = jwksSets.get(uri); if (!jwks) { jwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(uri)); jwksSets.set(uri, jwks) } return jwks }
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async function signature(value: string, secret: string): Promise<string> { const bytes = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', new TextEncoder().encode(secret), {name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256'}, false, ['sign']), new TextEncoder().encode(value)); return Buffer.from(bytes).toString('base64url') }
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function sameToken(left: string | undefined, right: string | undefined): boolean { if (!left || !right) return false; const a = Buffer.from(left); const b = Buffer.from(right); return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual(a, b) }
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function locked(key: string): boolean { const attempt = attempts.get(key); return Boolean(attempt && attempt.lockedUntil > Date.now()) }
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function recordFailure(key: string): void { const now = Date.now(); const attempt = attempts.get(key); const current = !attempt || now - attempt.firstAt > LOGIN_WINDOW_MS ? {count: 0, firstAt: now, lockedUntil: 0} : attempt; current.count++; if (current.count >= LOGIN_ATTEMPTS) current.lockedUntil = now + Math.min(15 * 60_000, 30_000 * 2 ** (current.count - LOGIN_ATTEMPTS)); attempts.set(key, current) }
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// Hono's portable Request API does not expose the peer address. Do not trust a
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// client-supplied X-Forwarded-For value until the Bun server is wired to verify
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// it against an explicit proxy address allow-list.
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function clientIp(_c: Context): string { return 'unknown' }
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function recordFailure(key: string, limit: number): void { const now = Date.now(); const attempt = attempts.get(key); const current = !attempt || now - attempt.firstAt > LOGIN_WINDOW_MS ? {count: 0, firstAt: now, lockedUntil: 0} : attempt; current.count++; if (current.count >= limit) current.lockedUntil = now + Math.min(15 * 60_000, 30_000 * 2 ** (current.count - limit)); if (!attempts.has(key) && attempts.size >= MAX_ATTEMPTS) attempts.delete(attempts.keys().next().value!); attempts.set(key, current) }
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// X-Forwarded-For is client-controlled, so it is only read when the TCP peer is an
|
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// allow-listed proxy. The right-most address not belonging to a trusted proxy is the
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// one the outermost trusted proxy actually saw; anything left of it may be forged.
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function clientIp(c: Context, config: AuthConfig): string {
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const peer = peerAddress(c)
|
||||
if (!peer || !trusted(peer, config.trustedProxies)) return peer ?? 'unknown'
|
||||
const forwarded = (c.req.header('x-forwarded-for') ?? '').split(',').map((entry) => normalizeIp(entry.trim()))
|
||||
for (let index = forwarded.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
|
||||
const address = forwarded[index]
|
||||
if (!isIP(address)) return peer
|
||||
if (!trusted(address, config.trustedProxies)) return address
|
||||
}
|
||||
return peer
|
||||
}
|
||||
function peerAddress(c: Context): string | undefined { try { const address = getConnInfo(c).remote.address; return address ? normalizeIp(address) : undefined } catch { return undefined } }
|
||||
function normalizeIp(address: string): string { return /^::ffff:\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/i.test(address) ? address.slice(7) : address }
|
||||
function trusted(address: string, proxies: BlockList | null): boolean { return Boolean(proxies?.check(address, isIP(address) === 6 ? 'ipv6' : 'ipv4')) }
|
||||
function parseTrustedProxies(value: string | undefined): BlockList | null {
|
||||
const entries = list(value)
|
||||
if (entries.length === 0) return null
|
||||
const proxies = new BlockList()
|
||||
for (const entry of entries) {
|
||||
const [address, prefix] = entry.split('/')
|
||||
const family = isIP(address)
|
||||
const bits = prefix === undefined ? undefined : Number(prefix)
|
||||
if (!family || (bits !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(bits) || bits < 0 || bits > (family === 6 ? 128 : 32)))) throw new Error(`FLOCI_UI_TRUSTED_PROXIES has an invalid IP or CIDR: ${entry}`)
|
||||
const type = family === 6 ? 'ipv6' : 'ipv4'
|
||||
if (bits === undefined) proxies.addAddress(address, type)
|
||||
else proxies.addSubnet(address, bits, type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return proxies
|
||||
}
|
||||
function applySecurityHeaders(c: Context, config: AuthConfig, styleNonce: string): void { c.header('Content-Security-Policy', `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-${styleNonce}' 'sha256-mgwziK4YXYUt2nNB711bt/nNzs3je0rpErGfX/6eqmc='; style-src 'self' 'nonce-${styleNonce}' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data:; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'`); c.header('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY'); c.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff'); c.header('Referrer-Policy', 'same-origin'); if (config.secureCookies) c.header('Strict-Transport-Security', 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains') }
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user