179 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
179 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: business-logic
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description: Business logic testing for workflow bypass, state manipulation, and domain invariant violations
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---
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# Business Logic Flaws
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Business logic flaws exploit intended functionality to violate domain invariants: move money without paying, exceed limits, retain privileges, or bypass reviews. They require a model of the business, not just payloads.
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## Attack Surface
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- Financial logic: pricing, discounts, payments, refunds, credits, chargebacks
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- Account lifecycle: signup, upgrade/downgrade, trial, suspension, deletion
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- Authorization-by-logic: feature gates, role transitions, approval workflows
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- Quotas/limits: rate/usage limits, inventory, entitlements, seat licensing
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- Multi-tenant isolation: cross-organization data or action bleed
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- Event-driven flows: jobs, webhooks, sagas, compensations, idempotency
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## High-Value Targets
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- Pricing/cart: price locks, quote to order, tax/shipping computation
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- Discount engines: stacking, mutual exclusivity, scope (cart vs item), once-per-user enforcement
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- Payments: auth/capture/void/refund sequences, partials, split tenders, chargebacks, idempotency keys
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- Credits/gift cards/vouchers: issuance, redemption, reversal, expiry, transferability
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- Subscriptions: proration, upgrade/downgrade, trial extension, seat counts, meter reporting
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- Refunds/returns/RMAs: multi-item partials, restocking fees, return window edges
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- Admin/staff operations: impersonation, manual adjustments, credit/refund issuance, account flags
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- Quotas/limits: daily/monthly usage, inventory reservations, feature usage counters
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## Reconnaissance
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### Workflow Mapping
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- Derive endpoints from the UI and proxy/network logs; map hidden/undocumented API calls, especially finalize/confirm endpoints
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- Identify tokens/flags: stepToken, paymentIntentId, orderStatus, reviewState, approvalId; test reuse across users/sessions
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- Document invariants: conservation of value (ledger balance), uniqueness (idempotency), monotonicity (non-decreasing counters), exclusivity (one active subscription)
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### Input Surface
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- Hidden fields and client-computed totals; server must recompute on trusted sources
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- Alternate encodings and shapes: arrays instead of scalars, objects with unexpected keys, null/empty/0/negative, scientific notation
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- Business selectors: currency, locale, timezone, tax region; vary to trigger rounding and ruleset changes
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### State and Time Axes
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- Replays: resubmit stale finalize/confirm requests
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- Out-of-order: call finalize before verify; refund before capture; cancel after ship
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- Time windows: end-of-day/month cutovers, daylight saving, grace periods, trial expiry edges
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## Key Vulnerabilities
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### State Machine Abuse
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- Skip or reorder steps via direct API calls; verify server enforces preconditions on each transition
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- Replay prior steps with altered parameters (e.g., swap price after approval but before capture)
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- Split a single constrained action into many sub-actions under the threshold (limit slicing)
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### Concurrency and Idempotency
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- Parallelize identical operations to bypass atomic checks (create, apply, redeem, transfer)
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- Abuse idempotency: key scoped to path but not principal → reuse other users' keys; or idempotency stored only in cache
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- Message reprocessing: queue workers re-run tasks on retry without idempotent guards; cause duplicate fulfillment/refund
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### Numeric and Currency
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- Floating point vs decimal rounding; rounding/truncation favoring attacker at boundaries
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- Cross-currency arbitrage: buy in currency A, refund in B at stale rates; tax rounding per-item vs per-order
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- Negative amounts, zero-price, free shipping thresholds, minimum/maximum guardrails
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### Quotas, Limits, and Inventory
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- Off-by-one and time-bound resets (UTC vs local); pre-warm at T-1s and post-fire at T+1s
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- Reservation/hold leaks: reserve multiple, complete one, release not enforced; backorder logic inconsistencies
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- Distributed counters without strong consistency enabling double-consumption
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### Refunds and Chargebacks
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- Double-refund: refund via UI and support tool; refund partials summing above captured amount
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- Refund after benefits consumed (downloaded digital goods, shipped items) due to missing post-consumption checks
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### Feature Gates and Roles
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- Feature flags enforced client-side or at edge but not in core services; toggle names guessed or fallback to default-enabled
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- Role transitions leaving stale capabilities (retain premium after downgrade; retain admin endpoints after demotion)
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## Advanced Techniques
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### Event-Driven Sagas
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- Saga/compensation gaps: trigger compensation without original success; or execute success twice without compensation
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- Outbox/Inbox patterns missing idempotency → duplicate downstream side effects
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- Cron/backfill jobs operating outside request-time authorization; mutate state broadly
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### Microservices Boundaries
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- Cross-service assumption mismatch: one service validates total, another trusts line items; alter between calls
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- Header trust: internal services trusting X-Role or X-User-Id from untrusted edges
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- Partial failure windows: two-phase actions where phase 1 commits without phase 2, leaving exploitable intermediate state
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### Multi-Tenant Isolation
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- Tenant-scoped counters and credits updated without tenant key in the where-clause; leak across orgs
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- Admin aggregate views allowing actions that impact other tenants due to missing per-tenant enforcement
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## Bypass Techniques
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- Content-type switching (JSON/form/multipart) to hit different code paths
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- Method alternation (GET performing state change; overrides via X-HTTP-Method-Override)
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- Client recomputation: totals, taxes, discounts computed on client and accepted by server
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- Cache/gateway differentials: stale decisions from CDN/APIM that are not identity-aware
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## Special Contexts
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### E-commerce
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- Stack incompatible discounts via parallel apply; remove qualifying item after discount applied; retain free shipping after cart changes
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- Modify shipping tier post-quote; abuse returns to keep product and refund
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### Banking/Fintech
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- Split transfers to bypass per-transaction threshold; schedule vs instant path inconsistencies
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- Exploit grace periods on holds/authorizations to withdraw again before settlement
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### SaaS/B2B
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- Seat licensing: race seat assignment to exceed purchased seats; stale license checks in background tasks
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- Usage metering: report late or duplicate usage to avoid billing or to over-consume
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## Chaining Attacks
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- Business logic + race: duplicate benefits before state updates
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- Business logic + IDOR: operate on others' resources once a workflow leak reveals IDs
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- Business logic + CSRF: force a victim to complete a sensitive step sequence
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## Testing Methodology
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1. **Enumerate state machine** - Per critical workflow (states, transitions, pre/post-conditions); note invariants
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2. **Build Actor × Action × Resource matrix** - Unauth, basic user, premium, staff/admin; identify actions per role
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3. **Test transitions** - Step skipping, repetition, reordering, late mutation
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4. **Introduce variance** - Time, concurrency, channel (mobile/web/API/GraphQL), content-types
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5. **Validate persistence boundaries** - All services, queues, and jobs re-enforce invariants
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## Validation
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1. Show an invariant violation (e.g., two refunds for one charge, negative inventory, exceeding quotas)
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2. Provide side-by-side evidence for intended vs abused flows with the same principal
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3. Demonstrate durability: the undesired state persists and is observable in authoritative sources (ledger, emails, admin views)
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4. Quantify impact per action and at scale (unit loss × feasible repetitions)
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## False Positives
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- Promotional behavior explicitly allowed by policy (documented free trials, goodwill credits)
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- Visual-only inconsistencies with no durable or exploitable state change
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- Admin-only operations with proper audit and approvals
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## Impact
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- Direct financial loss (fraud, arbitrage, over-refunds, unpaid consumption)
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- Regulatory/contractual violations (billing accuracy, consumer protection)
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- Denial of inventory/services to legitimate users through resource exhaustion
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- Privilege retention or unauthorized access to premium features
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## Pro Tips
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1. Start from invariants and ledgers, not UI—prove conservation of value breaks
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2. Test with time and concurrency; many bugs only appear under pressure
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3. Recompute totals server-side; never accept client math—flag when you observe otherwise
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4. Treat idempotency and retries as first-class: verify key scope and persistence
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5. Probe background workers and webhooks separately; they often skip auth and rule checks
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6. Validate role/feature gates at the service that mutates state, not only at the edge
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7. Explore end-of-period edges (month-end, trial end, DST) for rounding and window issues
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8. Use minimal, auditable PoCs that demonstrate durable state change and exact loss
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9. Chain with authorization tests (IDOR/Function-level access) to magnify impact
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10. When in doubt, map the state machine; gaps appear where transitions lack server-side guards
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## Summary
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Business logic security is the enforcement of domain invariants under adversarial sequencing, timing, and inputs. If any step trusts the client or prior steps, expect abuse.
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